Inquiring into Others' Conceptions of the International and Security by Bilgin P.
652  PS • July 2017 © American Political Science Association, 2017 doi:10.1017/S1049096517000324
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
P O L I T I C S  SY M P O S I U M
Inquiring into Others’ Conceptions of 
the International and Security
Pinar Bilgin, Bilkent University, Ankara
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
As part of a project focusing on the ethical implications of European Union (EU) border- security practices in the Mediterranean region, I conducted research from 2008 to 2011 into the EU’s (then increasingly controversial) exter-
nalization practices vis-à-vis its southern Mediterranean 
neighbors.1 Less than two months after the final report was 
submitted, these same countries experienced the tidal wave 
that came to be known as the “Arab uprisings.” This article 
describes my encounter with the limitations of disciplinary 
social sciences when doing empirical work on the southern 
Mediterranean. It then suggests that had we given more 
attention to what people in the Arab world (elites and others) 
thought about security, the uprisings would have come as 
less of a surprise. One way to address these limitations, I sub-
mit, is inquiring into others’ conception of the international 
and security. By “others,” I mean those who happen to not be 
located on or near the top of the hierarchies in world politics 
and who enjoy unequal influence in shaping various dynam-
ics, including the study of world politics. Restated in Valbjørn’s 
threefold categorization, I call for more cross-fertilization 
between Middle East studies and disciplinary social sciences, 
including international relations (IR).
In early 2008, I began my research by conducting a litera-
ture review. The findings and conclusions of that review were 
summarized in a short paper entitled “EU Security Policies 
towards the Mediterranean: The Ethical Dimension—What 
Do We Know and What Else Should We Know?” (Bilgin 2009). 
My conclusion was that, as students of security, we knew 
almost nothing about the perspectives of the Mediterranean 
littoral states on what they thought about EU border-security 
practices in their part of the world—practices that their own 
governments were increasingly adopting. There were two 
dimensions to the limits of our knowledge on this subject. 
First, the literature focused on how the EU approached border 
security—what its interests were and what steps were being 
taken. Second, to the extent that the practices adopted by the 
southern Mediterranean neighbors were documented, their 
perspective on agreeing to such cooperation and whether they 
were pursuing interests different from those of the EU were 
not being considered. At best, these differences were reduced 
to “national-interest” calculations, without considering the 
ways in which they were shaped by different conceptions of 
the international and security.
These two limitations of the security literature correspond 
to two aspects of the parochial limitations of the study of 
world politics. On the one hand, parochialism is “an almost 
inevitable and universal characteristic” of the study of world 
politics insofar as “there are ‘national’ IR disciplines and that 
these quite naturally tend to be concerned with their own 
national interests” (Hellmann 2011). Viewed as such, schol-
ars in those parts of the world that are adversely affected by 
environmental degradation may prioritize the study of green 
politics, whereas scholars who are citizens of great powers 
may focus on their country’s hegemonic ambitions and those 
of other aspiring hegemons. On the other hand, what renders 
parochialism a challenge for the study of world politics is not 
that scholars in different parts of the world may have particu-
lar areas of interest and/or concentration but rather when our 
theorizing about the world mistakes those theories driven 
from “particular” observations for the “universal.” Understood 
in this latter sense, parochialism pervades the study of world 
politics and constitutes a limitation for our understanding of 
the Arab world and beyond (Alker and Biersteker 1984).
After having identified the parochial limitations of the 
existing literature on EU border practices vis-à-vis the south-
ern Mediterranean neighbors, I moved to the next stage of 
our project: remedying these limitations. Determined to not 
overlook the perspectives of the southern Mediterranean 
neighbors, my research associates and I organized a series 
of interviews with individuals representing various non-
state actors. Our findings pointed to a rift between regional 
regimes and peoples on security cooperation with the EU. 
That regional regimes were increasingly viewed by their 
own people as doing the “dirty work” of the EU by agreeing 
to become a part of externalization practices was an issue 
that rarely arose in the literature. We wrote the following in 
our report:
While cooperation with the EU has allowed [regimes] access to 
new technologized instruments and resulted in the weakening 
of EU criticism of acts of repression in the short term, it also has 
further alienated civil society from the regimes, thus enhancing 
their insecurity in the long term. This alienation was evident 
from our interviews (Bilgin, Soler i Lecha, and Bilgic 2011).
The point is that considering the perspectives of the southern 
Mediterranean neighbors—that is, perspectives of those beyond 
the policy-making elite—revealed symptoms of unforeseen 
developments in the southern Mediterranean. The Arab 





However, to what extent were these developments unan-
ticipated? They need not have been, if only the insights of 
scholars specializing in the study of Arab politics were inte-
grated into security theorizing about rendering our concepts 
less parochial. The story of the so-called area-studies contro-
versy is almost always told by focusing on the limitations of 
area studies (see Valbjørn in this issue). In the immediate 
aftermath of the Arab uprisings, it was the students of Middle 
East studies who were chastised for missing the develop-
ments. Nevertheless, disciplinary social sciences also bear 
responsibility insofar as they have become oblivious to their 
parochial limitations, especially the second aspect—that is, 
mistaking one’s own particular experiences for the universal, 
thereby adopting particular notions of “national security” in 
designing research.
To clarify, the original task of area studies would have 
required students to render the disciplines less parochial 
by “testing” those frameworks with universalist pretentions 
against the empirical findings of area-studies scholars. Perhaps 
“testing,” as such, could have allowed for further develop-
ment of the theories at hand, thereby contributing to the 
project of achieving “universal” knowledge. However, the 
overbearing authority of the disciplines made it difficult for 
area-studies scholars to access—much less challenge—the 
disciplines (Bilgin 2004). Indeed, in recent years, efforts 
came to focus on studying the “areas” as part of an ostensi-
bly “universal” story told in and about North America and 
Western Europe (Mitchell 2002).
It is in this sense that one part of the responsibility falls on 
the social sciences disciplines (e.g., IR) that, by definition, are 
expected to be curious about “others” who also constitute the 
international. Yet, students of world politics have not always 
been interested in the world beyond the great powers. 
“Denmark does not matter,” quipped Kenneth Waltz, high-
lighting the marginality of smaller states to system theoriz-
ing. This is not because those who are in the peripheries of 
world politics also are relegated to the peripheries of their 
thinking. Instead, it is because the scholarly study of world 
politics has orientated its students to think of states as units, 
the internal composition and dynamics of which are of rela-
tively little consequence for world politics.
The choices made by the students of disciplinary social 
sciences in favor of conducting state– and great-power–centric 
analyses have implications for the study of world politics. In 
recent decades, scholarly treatises—even as they focused on 
other parts of the world—failed to be fully relevant to the 
concerns of people, states, and societies living in those other 
parts of the world. This is because analyses of “sagebrush wars,” 
“low-intensity conflicts,” and “guerrilla wars” focused on 
and thus were able to capture only the threat perceptions 
and interest calculations of the “First World” (Korany 1986). 
Stated differently, the “Third World”—even when it was the 
focal point of security scholarship—was not treated as the ref-
erent object (i.e., what/who needs protection). Whereas one 
part of the problem can be located in parochialism of the 
first type (i.e., that security scholarship has looked at from 
the perspective of Washington or Brussels, as discussed by 
Hazbun in this issue), another part of the problem is located 
in parochialism of the second type (i.e., the limitations of our 
ostensibly “universal” concepts and theories). The point is 
that the limitations we encounter in the study of world poli-
tics cannot be remedied only by shifting our perspective from 
the north to the south; we also need to inquire into others’ 
conceptions of the international and security.
The study of security may not be any better or worse than 
other disciplinary social sciences relative to parochialism. 
Toward the end of the Cold War, students of security studies 
were criticized by students of Soviet studies, who reminded 
them that the Soviet Union did not “play” the deterrence 
game in the way that deterrence theorists assumed. Indeed, 
deterrence theorizing developed almost independently of 
inquiring about the perspectives of those whom we were seek-
ing to deter (Booth 1979; MccGwire 1985). In the aftermath 
of the Cold War, Lebow and Stein (1995) wrote We All Lost 
the Cold War based on evidence they gathered by studying 
Cold War practices of deterrence by multiple nuclear powers. 
Abraham (1998) and Biswas (2014) highlighted how India tran-
sitioned from a postcolonial state in possession of a so-called 
peaceful bomb (from the late 1940s until the late 1990s) to a 
rising great power practicing “nuclear diplomacy” like other 
“normal” great powers (since 1998). These critical inquiries 
about deterrence thinking and practices highlighted the lim-
itations of security studies focusing on others’ approaches to 
security in general and deterrence in particular.
It was not a student of world politics but rather an anthro-
pologist, Hugh Gusterson, (1999), who unmistakably identified 
the parochialism of the study of security. In a survey of articles 
published from 1986 to 1989 in the subfield’s leading journal, 
International Security, Gusterson noted that those “readers who 
relied on the journal International Security alone for their under-
standing of world politics would have been taken more or less 
completely by surprise by the end of the Cold War in the fall 
of 1989” (Gusterson 1999). The point Gusterson made was not 
about (failures in) prediction in the study of security. Rather, 
he argued that “authors in the journal constructed a discursive 
world within which the indefinite continuation of the Cold War 
My conclusion was that, as students of security, we knew almost nothing about the 
perspectives of the Mediterranean littoral states on what they thought about EU 
border-security practices in their part of the world—practices that their own governments 
were increasingly adopting.
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was plausibly presumed and what we would in retrospect nar-
rate as signs of the impending end of the Cold War were ren-
dered dubious or invisible” (Gusterson 1999). Stated differently, 
Gusterson’s analysis highlighted how Anglo-American security 
concerns and a particular approach to them had become embed-
ded in the epistemology of security studies as reflected in the 
articles published in International Security. What led to parochi-
alism in the study of security, argued Gusterson, was not only 
the search for prediction through utilizing a particular way of 
thinking about world politics but also the subfield’s failures to 
recognize its particularity.
Although there have been attempts to render visible the 
“hierarchy in anarchy” (Donnelly 2006) and “hierarchy under 
anarchy” (Wendt and Friedheim 2009) in recognition of “ine-
qualities” between states, focus thus far has been on inequal-
ities in material power or institutionalized relationships of 
dependency. This is opposed to inequalities that follow rel-
egating one’s contemporaries to the past by temporalizing 
difference and spatializing time (Fabian 1983; Hindess 2007; 
Jabri 2013). The international is shaped by multiple inequal-
ities conditioned by twin processes of temporalizing difference 
and spatializing time, which shape the way we “see” the world 
while rendering less “visible” their institutionalized effects. 
A case in point is how the new or non-nuclear powers view 
the way that nuclear proliferation is managed by the great 
powers: as a “nuclear-apartheid” (see subsequent discussion). 
Such a “racially institutionalized global hierarchy” as viewed 
by the new or non-nuclear powers, however, cannot be cap-
tured through analyses that focus on inequalities in material 
power alone but rather calls for inquiring about who can and 
cannot “have” nuclear weapons and why (Biswas 2014). Yet, 
students of world politics have not always been socialized into 
being curious about others’ conception of the international; 
rather, they have been encouraged to dismiss such dynamics 
by superimposing ostensibly “universal” concepts and cate-
gories. For purposes of illustration, I focus on my own field 
of security studies. I suggest that students of security studies 
have not always been interested in the others’ conceptions of 
“security.” It was “particular” ways of thinking about world 
politics, which were presumed to be “universal,” that lured 
security analysts into presuming that a lack of curiosity about 
others’ approaches to world politics was not a problem when 
theorizing about the international and security.2
I conclude by returning to where I began: the Arab upris-
ings. I suggest that the uprisings need not have come across 
as unanticipated had we integrated insights from studies on 
Arab politics into security theorizing.
Writing in the early 1990s, Bahgat Korany (a member of 
the Montréal school; see Salloukh in this issue) identified 
a rift between two different conceptions of “Arab national 
security”: state-centric and society-centric conceptions (Korany, 
Brynen, and Noble 1993). The concept of “Arab national secu-
rity” is not new; it originated in the discourses of pan-Arabist 
policy makers during the (Arab) Cold War. However, in 
this early incarnation, “Arab national security” emphasized 
“Arab” identity and focused on the different insecurities of 
Arab states. Stated differently, the referent of security was 
the society of Arab states (Bilgin 2012). Korany’s contribution 
to this discussion was to distinguish between two conceptions 
of “Arab national security”: one taking the society of Arab 
states as its referent object, the other the trans-state society 
of Arab peoples (Korany 1994). This was a conception of secu-
rity that understood the international in not only anarchical 
but also hierarchical terms (Bilgin 2016). It also was a broad 
conception of security that considered nonmilitary as well as 
military dimensions.
Had we inquired into this notion of “Arab national secu-
rity” that transcends the “nation-state” to look at the trans-
state society of Arab peoples, we could arguably have noted a 
notion that was long declared dead by those who are unable 
to see beyond their parochial limitations (whether they are 
located in Washington, Brussels, or Cairo) was alive among 
non-state actors, continuing to shape their articulations of 
insecurity and activism. We perhaps could have generated 
better insight about insecurities experienced by various state 
and non-state actors in the Arab world, as well as the military, 
economic, and societal dimensions of insecurity. We then 
could have noticed that the rift between peoples and regimes 
In recent decades, scholarly treatises—even as they focused on other parts of the 
world—failed to be fully relevant to the concerns of people, states, and societies living in 
those other parts of the world. This is because analyses of “sagebrush wars,” “low-intensity 
conflicts,” and “guerrilla wars” focused on and thus were able to capture only the threat 
perceptions and interest calculations of the “First World” (Korany 1986).
The international is shaped by multiple inequalities conditioned by twin processes of 
temporalizing difference and spatializing time, which shape the way we “see” the world 




in the southern Mediterranean was growing as part of the 
latter’s security cooperation with the EU. Even more ambi-
tious, perhaps we could have incorporated these insights 
into security theorizing toward becoming more cognizant of 
others’ conceptions of the international and security. After 
all, the aim is to point to the particularity of our ostensibly 
“universal” concepts such as “national security,” not replac-
ing one particularism with another (Arab) particularism but 
rather rendering security theorizing less parochial. n
NOTES
 1. In EU parlance, “externalization” means practicing border security before 
people reach the physical border, by transferring EU rules to other 
countries to be implemented then and there. For more about the in:ex 
project (i.e., converging and conflicting ethical values in the internal/
external security in continuum in Europe), see www.inexproject.eu.
 2. An important and early exception in this regard is Booth (1979).
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